Preface to Science and the Philosophy of Life 科學與人生觀序

Before the Yadong Library printed the collection of articles regarding the debate on science and the philosophy of life, I was invited to write a preface for this collection. Though sick and idle at the time, I joyfully wrote the preface. Firstly, the issue of science and the philosophy of life, owing to the cultural backwardness of China, has not been discussed until recently. (Culturally backward Russia has had heated discussions on this issue before. Since then, their social sciences have developed, and any Russian who knows a little about social sciences will no longer have such meaningless discussions. This is similar to the situation where the Chinese clerisy will not talk about such questions as the ancient Chinese cosmology of the round sky and the square earth, what it is like when the sky moves and the earth is still, and whether the electric wires are spider monsters.) No matter how slow the process is, the issue has finally begun to be discussed. Although the supporters of science seemed to be triumphant in the opposing the debate on Zhang Junmai and Liang Qichao, it was a pity that they did not break through the enemies’ stronghold. They only broke up several detachments, and some advocates of science, behind the facade of fighting, have secretly surrendered. (For instance, “A priori modes” from Fan Shoukang and Agnosticism of Science from Ren Shuyong’s Philosophy of Life.)¹“A priori and a posteriori” were popularized by Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, an influential work in the history of philosophy. Kitcher, Philip “A Priori Knowledge Revisited” in New Essays on the A Priori. ed. Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 65-91. Serving as the “chief debater”, Ding Wenjiang strongly refuted Zhang Junmai’s idealistic views. In fact, Ding himself was an example of “the pot calling the kettle black”. Although there was a weapon that could be used to break through the enemies’ stronghold, they never believed it, so they were not willing to use it. The supporters of metaphysics presented some plausible evidence on “How science cannot dominate the philosophy of life”; however, there was no evidence provided on “How science can dominate the philosophy of life” by the supporters of science. From my perspective, this was not a victory for the advocates of science, but virtually a disastrous defeat. Although there were a large number of articles written, most of them were “thousands of words written, straying far from the topic”. For readers, they seemed to read “the lecture notes of the introduction to science”, yet they could barely find the arguments of both sides. The excessively irrelevant arguments from Zhang were straying away from the topic, the greatest pity throughout the dispute! Secondly, Hu Shi still believed that “Historical materialism can at most explain most problems of life”.²The general theory of the motive forces and laws of social change, developed on the basis of Marx’s discoveries, is known as the materialist conception of history, or historical materialism. The materialist conception of history was arrived at by applying the materialist world outlook to the solution of social problems. And because he made this application, materialism was with Marx no longer simply a theory aimed at interpreting the world, but a guide to the practice of changing the world, of building a society without exploitation of man by man. Above all, historical materialism has a contemporary significance. Cornforth, Maurice Campbell, Historical materialism (New York: International Publishers, 1954), Vol. 2, 12. After participating in this debate, Hu Shi would no doubt make great progress in his philosophy of life! Concerning the two previous reasons, I was delighted to write this preface.

There is no need to discuss the relationship between mathematics, physics, chemistry, and other natural sciences and the philosophy of life. However, scientific methods of observation and classification are subsequently applied to living creatures, and even to human society with the highest activeness. Therefore, science is roughly divided into two categories, i.e., natural sciences and social sciences. The most prominent pillars of social sciences are economics, sociology, history, psychology, and philosophy. Here, philosophy refers to experimentalism and historical materialism, but not the metaphysics of ontology and cosmology. Needless to say, social sciences, along with natural sciences, are still immature. Even so, they have already achieved undeniable achievements. If we abandon those sciences because of their weaknesses, it is not a wise move. It is incontestable that the natural sciences have demonstrated and explained many phenomena in the natural world, and the social sciences also have illustrated many phenomena in human society. Nature and human society have their own actual phenomenon. A scientist’s hypothesis will not change the truth; neither will the flight of fancies of a metaphysician; the actual phenomenon is solid and immutable with either materialism or idealism. Before Copernicus’s discovery, the earth has always been revolving around the sun. Following Mencius, the world gradually became one without kings. The final success is when scientific inductions can match this immutable reality one after another. The reason why we believe in science (either natural sciences or social sciences) is that “The ultimate goal of scientists is to eliminate the role of human inclination and objectify all phenomena. Therefore, all phenomena can be projected and all the causation can be calculated.” (quoted from Zhang Junmai). If so, then we can seek further realities based on truth and conclude that the immutable reality of nature and human society is different from the fallacies of metaphysicians. 

數學、物理學、化學等科學，和人生觀有什麼關係，這問題本不用着討論。可是後來科學的觀察、分類說明等方法應用到活動的生物，更應用到最活動的人類社會，於是便有人把科學略分為自然科學與社會科學二類。社會科學中最主要的是經濟學、社會學、歷史學、心理學、哲學（這裡所指是實驗主義的及唯物史觀的人生哲學，不是指本體論、宇宙論的玄學，即所謂形而上的哲學）。這些社會科學，不用說和那些自然科學都還在幼稚時代，然即是幼稚，已經有許多不可否認的成績，若因為還幼稚便不要他，我們不必這樣蠢。自然科學已經說明了自然界許多現象，這是我們不能否認的；社會科學已經說明了人類社會許多現象，這也是我們不能否認的。自然界及社會都有他的實際現象。科學家說明得對，他原來是那樣；科學家說明得不對，他仍舊是那樣；玄學家無論如何胡想亂說，他仍舊是那樣；他的實際現象是死板板的，不是隨着你們唯物論唯心論改變的。 哥白尼以前，地球原來在那裡繞日而行，孟軻以後，漸漸變成了無君的世界；科學的說明能和這死板板的實際一一符合，才是最後的成功。我們所以相信科學（無論自然科學或社會科學）也就是因為“科學家之最大目的，曰摒除人意之作用，而一切現象化之為客觀的，因而可以推算，可以窮其因果之相生”（張君勱語），必如此而後可以根據實際尋求實際，而後可以說明自然界及人類社會死板板的實際，和玄學家的胡想亂說不同。

人生觀和（社會）科學的關係是很顯明的，為什麼大家還要討論？哈哈！就是討論這個問題之本身，也可以證明人生觀和科學的關係之深了。孔德分人類社會為三時代，我們還在宗教迷信時代。你看全國最大多數的人，還是迷信、巫鬼、符咒、算命、卜卦等超物質以上的神秘；次多數象張君勱這樣相信玄學的人，舊的士的階級全體，新的士的階級一大部分皆是，象丁在君這樣相信科學的人，其數目幾乎不能列入統計。現在由迷信時代進步到科學時代，自然要經過玄學先生的狂吠，這種社會的實際現象，想無人能夠否認。倘不能否認，便不能不承認孔德三時代說是社會科學上一種定律。這個定律便可以說明許多時代、許多社會、許多個人的人生觀之所以不同。譬如張君勱是個飽學秀才，他一日病了，他的未嘗學問的家族要去求符咒仙方，張君勱立意要延醫診脈服藥；他的朋友丁在君方從外國留學回來，說漢醫靠不住，堅勸他去請西醫，張君勱不但不相信，並說出許多西醫不及漢醫的證據；兩人爭持正烈的時候，張君勱的家族說，西醫、漢醫都靠不住，還是符咒仙方好。他們如此不同的見解，也便是他們如此不同的人生觀，他們如此不同的人生觀，都是他們所遭客觀的環境造成的，決不是天外飛來主觀的意志造成的，這本是社會科學可以說明的，決不是形而上的玄學可以說明的。

Zhang Junmai enumerated nine philosophies of life, all of which he said were subjective, arising from intuition, synthesis, freedom of will, and the singularity of personality, but not governed by such attributes of science as objectivity, logic methods, analytical approach, and causation. Zhang’s nine philosophies of life are analyzed into nine points listed below: Firstly, the phenomena of Dajiazu Zhuyi (大家族主義, an extended family) and Xiaojiazu Zhuyi (小家族主義, a nuclear family) are purely natural evolutions from an agrarian patriarchal society to an industrial military society. Secondly, the changes in the status of men and women and the forms of marriage are also the results of social changes. In the agrarian patriarchal society, parents and husbands treat their children and their wives as instruments of production and as a form of property. In the industrial society, where domestic handwork is no longer applicable and labor hire exists, there is no need to use the family as an instrument of production, so the feminist movement naturally flourished. Thirdly, the difference between common and private ownership of property. In primitive societies, where humankind was weaker than beasts, there was no need or possibility of private ownership of property, so men were bound to cooperate in groups. (For example, Mr. X, with his unique personality, lived in a primitive society. Even though he wanted to have private ownership of property out of subjectivity and the freedom of will, there was no place for him to store the fruit and meat he acquired, nor were there ways for him to preserve and sell the food and save the money in the bank. I am afraid that Mr. X had to give up his private ownership of property. In the agricultural society, where there was a certain number of shelters and storehouses, and grains were easier to preserve, the individual farmers only needed to occupy the land with no demands to collaborate. This is how the notion of private property came about. In industrial society, self-reliant family labor has disappeared, and thousands of people are organized in cooperative units. Everyone must make a living by working with tools. Only a few capitalists own the production tools. Without common property, everyone must work hard for capitalists. Then the notion of common property exists. Fourthly, the conflict between conservatives and reformists. As a result of economic changes in society, the former social system, which was incompatible with these changes, remained in place and fettered the development of society. Therefore, classes with different economic interests naturally clashed with each other in a mild or radical way due to the degrees of these changes. Fifth, people have different views of material and spiritual objects. A minority of people can possess a unique/luxurious environment. Generally, it is not just manual workers in factories, even the editors at Shangwu Yinshuguan (商務印書館, the Commercial Press), who earn 20 to 30 silver coins a month, are worried about food and clothing every day. They do not have the leisure time or energy to talk about Eastern spiritual civilisation as Zhang Junmai and Liang Qichao do. Sixth, the emergence of socialism is inherently the same as common ownership. Seventh, there are two instincts in human nature, egoism, and altruism. However, the occurrences of one instinct, either for the self or for others, are subject to the time and the social environment where an individual is living. Eighth, different understandings of the same matter, either from a pessimist or an optimist, are also affected by time and the social environment. Statistics on suicide in various countries have indicated that they are caused by the environment, in addition to other factors, such as age, gender, occupation, seasons, etc. Ninth, the shift of religious thinking is dictated more by time and social forces. The primitive religions of various ethnic nations, according to their own legends, were mostly nature religions worshiping natural objects, including the sun, fire, mountains, boulders, poisonous snakes, beasts, and so on. Later, in the patriarchal society based on the agricultural economy, polytheism prevailed as people worshiped clan spirits, ancestor spirits, and agricultural gods. Later developments in commerce and the national unification movement allowed monotheism to dominate mainstream religion. The subsequent development in industry and the flourishing of science led to the popularisation of atheism and antitheism. Even though people of different ethnic nations lived in the same period, the pace of their social and technological developments varied, and so are their religious thoughts. The primitive tribal peoples in Africa, America, and Southeast Asia practiced naturalistic religions, those in China and India polytheism, and those in Europe and the United States, with the developed commerce and industry, Christianity. If a follower of Confucius were born in London, he would also believe in Christianity and praise Jehovah. If a Christian were born in a desolate place in China, he would worship his ancestors and foxes. Each of these nine views of life is governed by objective causation, which can be analysed one after another by social sciences. None of these philosophies of life can exist without objective causes, occurring groundlessly out of subjectivity, intuition, and freedom of will.

張君勱舉出九項人生觀，說都是主觀的，起於直覺的、綜合的、自由意志的，起於人格之單一性的，而不為客觀的、論理的、分析的、因果律的科學所支配。今就其九項人生觀看起來：第一，大家族主義和小家族主義，純粹是由農業經濟宗法社會進化到工業經濟軍國社會之自然的現象。第二，男女尊卑及婚姻制度，也是由於農業宗法社會親與夫都把子女及妻當作生產工具，當作一種財產，到了工業社會，家庭手工已不適用，有了僱工制度，也用不着拿家族當生產工具，於是女權運動自然會興旺起來。第三，財產公有私有制度，在原始共產社會，人弱於獸，勢必結群合作，原無財產私有之必要與可能（假定有人格之單一性的張先生，生在那個社會，他的主觀，他的直覺，他的自由意志，忽然要把財產私有起來，怎奈他所得的果物獸肉無地存儲，並沒有防腐的方法，又不能變賣金錢存在銀行，結果恐怕只有放棄他私有財產的人生觀）；到了農業社會，有了一定的住所，有了倉庫，穀物又比較的易於保存，獨立生產的小農，只有土地佔有的必要，沒有通力合作的必要，私有財產觀念，是如此發生的。到了工業社會，家庭的手工的獨立生產制已不能存立，成千成萬的人組織在一個通力合作的機關之內，大家無工做便無飯吃，無工具便不能做工，大家都沒有生產工具，生產工具已為少數資本家私有了，非將生產工具收歸公有，大家只好賣力給資本家，公有財產觀念，是如此發生的。第四，守舊維新之爭持，乃因為現社會有了經濟的變化，而與此變化不適應的前社會之制度仍舊存在，束縛着這變化的發展，於是在經濟上利害不同的階級，自然會隨着變化之激徐，或激或徐的衝突起來。第五，物質精神之異見，少數人因為有他的特殊環境，一般論起來，慢說工廠里體力工人了，就是商務印書館月薪二三十元的編輯先生，日愁衣食不濟，那有如許閑情像張君勱、梁啟超高談什麼精神文明東方文化。第六，社會主義之發生，和公有財產制是一事。第七，人性中本有為我利他兩種本能，個人本能發揮的機會，乃由於所遭環境及所受歷史的社會的暗示之不同而異。第八，悲觀、樂觀見解之不同，亦由於個人所遭環境及所受歷史的社會的暗示而異，試觀各國自殺的統計不但自殺的原因都是環境使然，而且和年齡、性別、職業、季節等都有關係。第九，宗教思想之變遷，更是要受時代及社會勢力支配的。各民族原始的宗教，依據所傳神話，大都是崇拜太陽、火、高山、巨石、毒蛇、猛獸等的自然教；後來到了農業經濟宗法社會，族神祖先農神等多神教遂至流行；後來商業發達，隨着國家的統一運動，一神教遂至得勢；後來工業發達，科學勃興，無神非宗教之說隨之而起；即在同一時代，各民族各社會產業進化之遲速不同，宗教思想亦隨之而異，非洲、美洲、南洋蠻族，仍在自然宗教時代，中國、印度，乃信多神，商工業發達之歐美，多奉基督；使中國聖人之徒生於倫敦，他也要奉洋教，歌頌耶和華；使基督信徒生在中國窮鄉僻壤，他也要崇拜祖宗與狐狸。以上九項種種不同的人生觀都為種種不同客觀的因果所支配，而社會科學可一一加以分析的論理的說明，找不出那一種是沒有客觀的原因，而由於個人主觀的直覺的自由意志憑空發生的。

梁啟超究竟比張君勱高明些，他說：“君勱列舉‘我對非我’之九項，他以為不能用科學方法解答者，依我看來，什有八九倒是要用科學方法解答。”梁啟超取了騎牆態度，一面不贊成張君勱，一面也不贊成丁在君，他自己的意見是：

“人生問題，有大部分是可以——而且必要用科學方法來解決的。卻有一小部分——或者還是最重要的部分是超科學的。”